Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under Co-opetition by Hattori, Keisuke & Yoshikawa, Takeshi
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Free Entry and Social Inefficiency under
Co-opetition
Keisuke Hattori and Takeshi Yoshikawa
Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, Graduate
School of Economics, University of Hyogo
6. March 2013
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/52501/
MPRA Paper No. 52501, posted 27. December 2013 13:23 UTC
Free Entry and Social Ineciency under Co-opetition
Keisuke Hattori Takeshi Yoshikaway
Abstract
We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which rms
compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that
aect consumers' willingness to pay for products. Our ndings show that free entry leads to
socially excessive or insucient market entry in the case of non-commitment co-opetition,
depending on the magnitude of \business stealing" and \common property" eects of entry.
On the other hand, in the case of pre-commitment co-opetition, free entry leads to excess
entry and a decline in common property resources. Interestingly, in this case, the excess
entry results of Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura and Kiyono (1987) hold even
when there are no entry (set-up) costs. These results have important policy implications for
entry regulation.
Keywords Excess entry; Free entry; Co-opetition; Entry regulations; Common property
resource
JEL Code L13; D43; L51
1 Introduction
In many industries, rms compete for market share while cooperating to manage common prop-
erty resources that aect the market size or consumers' willingness to pay for products. This
simultaneous competition and cooperation is called \co-opetition" (Brandenburger and Nale-
bu 1996). For example, mobile phone companies, tourist sites, and food courts share common
property resources such as base-station antennas, historic ruins in natural environments, and
common dining areas, respectively. The quality of the common property resources aects the
market size and/or consumers' willingness to pay for products or services. In addition, the high
quality of such resources generates non-excludable benets for all rms in the industry. There-
fore, each rm's investment in common property resources (e.g., erecting additional base-station
antennas, preserving historic ruins and natural environment, and maintaining a hygienic eating
environment) creates public-good benets that all the rms can enjoy.1 Another example of such
co-opetitive behavior is generic advertising for various commodities such as beverages, fruit, and
Corresponding author: Faculty of Economics, Osaka University of Economics, 2-2-8, Osumi,
Higashiyodogawa-ku, Osaka 533-8533, Japan. Email: hattori@osaka-ue.ac.jp Tel: +81-6-6328-2431 Fax: +81-6-
6328-2655
yGraduate School of Economics, University of Hyogo, 8-2-1, Gakuennishi-machi, Nishi-ku, Kobe-shi, Hyogo
651-2197, Japan. Email: yoshikawa.t58@gmail.com
1A mobile phone company's investment to expand its service ares has a positive external eect on the prots
of rival mobile phone carriers because the investment increases the availability of calls between dierent mobile
carriers. The investment also benets consumers and increases their willingness to pay for phone services.
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meat and dairy products. Improving product image generates non-excludable benets for all
producers providing the same products. Firms' investment in product safety is also considered
as a co-opetive behavior when they share an industry's collective reputation for product safety.
In the aforementioned examples, rms share the product image as a common property resource
and sometimes voluntarily contribute to improving it.2
Is free entry into such co-opetitive industries desirable from a social welfare perspective? To
answer this question, we have to identify the following two eects of free entry on social welfare:
One is the well-known business stealing eect of entry, which creates production ineciency
in the presence of scale economies (Mankiw and Whinston 1986, Suzumura and Kiyono 1987)
and generally leads to socially excessive entry. Another is the eect of entry on the amount
of common property resources, which we call the common property eect of entry. On the one
hand, an increase in the number of rms may increase the total investment in common property
resources. In this case, free entry may result in socially insucient entry because rms do not
consider the positive external eect of their investment in common property resources on other
rms. On the other hand, an increase in the number of rms may also exacerbate the under-
provision of common property resources, which may lead to a tragedy-of-the-commons situation.
For instance, an increase in the number of tourism rms can deteriorate the quality of tourist
attractions (such as wild life and historic ruins), which can eventually destroy tourism itself. As
Puppim de Oliveira (2003) indicates, locations such as Acapulco in Mexico, the French Rivera
and Mallorca and Torremolinos in Spain have faced tourism-related environmental issues. In
these cases, the common property eect contributes to socially excessive entry. This conjecture
leads us to the question of whether the government should regulate or encourage rm entry into
the co-opetitive industry.
In this study, we formulate a simple model of co-opetition with endogenous entry to present
a welfare analysis of free entry equilibrium. In particular, we consider whether the number
of rms that can enter a co-opetitive market is excessive or insucient from the viewpoint
of social welfare. We distinguish between two types of co-opetitive investment in common
property resources: pre-commitment and non-commitment investments. In the case of non-
commitment investment, rms choose their output and investment in the same stage; we call
this game a \simultaneous co-opetition game." In the case of pre-commitment investment, rms
determine their investment before they choose their output; we call this game a \sequential
co-opetition game." In both game, rms' entry decisions are made in the rst stage. The
dierence between non-commitment and pre-commitment investments reects the dierence in
reversibility and persistency in investments. When investment has long-term impacts and is
dicult to reverse (e.g., renovating historic buildings in a tourist area and increasing base-
station antennas for mobile phone networks), it has strategic commitment value, which can be
described by a sequential co-opetition game. On the other hand, when investment has short-
term impacts and is easy to reverse (e.g., providing generic advertising in daily newspapers and
cleaning shopping malls or food courts), it has no strategic commitment value, which can be
described as a simultaneous co-opetition game.
2Other examples of co-opetition include development of open-source software and rent-seeking or lobbying
for permission to sell product to certain groups (e.g., lobbying for the relaxation of regulations against the sale
of tobacco or alcohol products to under-age people, of specic medicines to a mass of people, and of nancial
products to inexperienced consumers).
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We show that free entry into a co-opetitive industry is socially excessive or insucient depends
on the relative strength of business stealing and common property eects of entry. The former,
as has been indicated by previous studies such as Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Suzumura
and Kiyono (1987), is based on the fact that an entrant rm does not take into account its
negative impact (externality) on other rms' prots. Therefore, when rms face xed entry
(set-up) costs, the business stealing eect leads to the excess entry of rms in the market owing
to socially wasteful replication of entry costs. The latter eect is novel and depends on the
eect of entry on the total amount (or quality) of common property resources. An increase
in the number of entrants increases the incentive to \free ride" on other rms' investments in
common property resources (public goods). However, the total amount (or quality) of common
property resources may increase because of a rise in the number of entrants. If that is the case,
then such entry will generate positive external eects on other rms. Because private rms do
not take the positive externality into account when deciding whether to enter a market, the
common property eect leads to insucient entry. On the other hand, if market entry results
in a decline in the total amount (or quality) of common property resources, then such entry will
create negative external eects on other rms. In this case, a negative common property eect
leads to excess entry.
We nd that in the simultaneous co-opetition game, an increase in the number of rms in-
creases the total investment in common property resources while reducing individual investment
per rm. Thus, the business stealing and common property eects function in opposite direc-
tions. In other words, whether free entry is socially excessive or insucient depends on the
relative magnitude of the two eects. In particular, by providing two concrete examples that
assume linear and constant elasticity demand, we show that free entry is more likely to result
in socially insucient entry when initial market size as well as investment and production cost
are smaller and/or the demand is more elastic.
However, the business stealing and common property eects work in the same directions in
the sequential co-opetition game, in which investment has a commitment value. The important
aspect in this case is that the total investment in common property resources is decreased by
an increase in the number of entrants. This is in contrast to the result of the simultaneous
co-opetition game, because when investment has a commitment value, an increase in rm's
investments induces rival rms to respond more aggressively by increasing their output in the
subsequent stage. Therefore, this pre-commitment eect of investment reduces the incentive
to invest in common property resources. Because an increase in the number of rival rms
strengthens the pre-commitment eect, the sequential co-opetition game gives rise to a negative
common property eect of entry. As a result, excess entry holds in sequential co-opetition.
Interestingly, we show that the excess entry results hold for the sequential co-opetition game
even when there are no entry (set-up) costs due to the negative common property eect.
Our results enrich the established excess entry theorem in theoretical industrial organization
literature.3 The theorem shows that in a Cournot model with homogenous products, free entry
is socially excessive when rms incur xed entry costs.4 Our results from the simultaneous co-
opetition game suggest that free entry may lead to socially insucient entry when rms share
3See Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Suzumura and Kiyono (1987), von Weizsacker (1980) and Perry (1984).
4Berry and Waldfogel (1999) empirically examine the problem of excess entry into U.S. commercial radio
broadcasting and estimate the welfare loss due to excess entry.
3
common property resources that aect market size or consumers' willingness to pay for products.
Furthermore, we also show that excess entry occurs in the sequential co-opetition game even
when there are no entry costs.
In the existing literature, the excess entry theorem has been extended in various directions.
For example, Konishi et al. (1990) extend the traditional Cournot model with free entry to
a general equilibrium model and explore Pareto-improving tax-subsidy policies. Incorporating
strategic cost-reducing R&D activities into the Cournot model with free entry, Okuno-Fujiwara
and Suzumura (1993) show that the existence of R&D investment strengthens the tendency of
excess entry in a free-entry equilibrium.5 There is a critical dierence between R&D investment
in their study and investment in common property resources in our study: in their study,
investment generates private benets for the investing rm, while in our study, investment
generates public benets for all rms.
Previous studies have found that free entry can result in socially insucient entry (e.g.,
Spence 1976, Dixit and Stiglitz 1977, Kuhn and Vives 1999, and Ghosh and Saha 2007). Ghosh
and Morita (2007) consider a vertical relationship between industries in a homogeneous Cournot
model and show that free entry in the upstream sector can lead to socially insucient entry.
The driving force behind their insucient entry result is that entry in the upstream sector has
a positive external eect on the downstream sector's prot. On the other hand, the driving
force behind our insucient entry result is that entry may have a positive external eect on
other rms' prots through changes in the quality of common property resources. Incorporating
constant elasticity demand into a standard Salop (1979) spatial framework, Gu and Wenzel
(2009) show that the excess entry theorem does not hold when the price elasticity of demand
is large. Although their study diers from ours in several respects, the conclusions are similar:
insucient entry occurs when price elasticity of demand is large. Therefore, the degree of price
elasticity of demand may serve as a guideline for entry regulation policy.6
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model.
Section 3 considers a simultaneous co-opetition game, investigates the properties of free-entry
equilibrium, and compares it with the second-best solution. In addition, it presents two examples
that specify the functional form of demand (linear and constant elasticity demands) as well as the
cost functions to provide more concrete results. Section 4 investigates the same for a sequential
co-opetition game. Section 5 discusses some policy implications and a possible extension of the
analysis. Section 6 concludes the study.
2 Basic Framework
Consider n rms producing a homogenous good. The rms compete in their output in a market
while investing in common property resources that serve as a public good for all the competing
5Haruna and Goel (2011) also consider the problem of excess entry in the presence of cost-reducing R&D with
spillovers and show that whether free entry is socially excessive or insucient depends on the degree of research
spillovers.
6Matsumura and Okamura (2006) show that the equilibrium number of rms can be either excessive or insu-
cient in a spatial price discrimination model. Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2008) and Mukherjee (2012) theoretically
show that free entry can result in socially insucient entry in the presence of technology licensing or market lead-
ers.
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rms. Prots of rm i (i = 1;    ; n) are given by
i = P (Q;Z)  qi   C(qi) D(zi) K; (1)
where P (Q;Z) is the market price (or inverse demand) of the product, qi  0 is rm i's output,
Q  Pni=1 qi is the industry output, zi  0 is rm i's investment (or individual contribution
to common property resources), Z  Pni=1 zi is the total investment (or quality of common
property resources), C(qi) is the cost function for production, D(zi) is the cost function for
investment, and K  0 is the xed entry (set-up) cost. The inverse demand P (Q;Z) has the
properties of PQ < 0, PZ > 0, and PZZ  0. The second and third properties indicate that
increasing the total investment increases consumers' willingness to pay, but by a non-increasing
rate. In addition, the production cost function C() has the properties of C 0 > 0 and C 00  0,
while the investment cost function D() has those of D0 > 0 and D00 > 0.
We consider two types of co-opetitive behavior of rms: simultaneous and sequential co-
opetition. In simultaneous co-opetition, rms' investments have no commitment value and are
modeled to be simultaneously decided with output. Therefore, it is modeled as a two-stage
game: in the rst stage, rms make entry decisions and the number of rms in the industry is
endogenously decided; in the second stage, each rm non-cooperatively decides its investment
and output. On the other hand, in sequential co-opetition, rms' investments are committed and
are modeled to be decided before choosing output. Therefore, it is modeled as a three-stage game:
in the rst stage, rms make entry decisions; in the second stage, each rm non-cooperatively
decides its investment; and in the last stage, each rm engages in Cournot competition. Within
the above framework, we derive the number of rms in a free-entry equilibrium and compare it
with the socially optimal number of rms.
To obtain clear and intuitive results, we employ specic functional forms and consider two
types of demands. One is linear demand, expressed by
P (Q;Z) = (a+ Z)  bQ; (2)
where a and b are positive constants. Obviously, PQ =  b < 0, PZ = 1 > 0, and PZZ = 0,
which satisfy our earlier assumptions. The other type of demand is constant elasticity demand,
expressed by
P (Q;Z) =

a+ Z
Q
1=
; (3)
where a is positive constant and  is price elasticity of demand. We further assume   1 to
satisfy PZZ  0. Furthermore, we employ the constant marginal cost of production and the
quadratic investment cost function, respectively, as
C(qi) = c qi; and D(zi) = (d=2)(zi)2;
where c > 0 and d > 0.
3 Free entry under simultaneous co-opetition
In this section, we consider a simultaneous co-opetition in which rms' investments have no
commitment value. This situation can be modeled by a procedure in which each simultaneously
rm decides its output and investment.
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3.1 Production and investment decisions
This game can be solved by backward induction. The rst-order conditions for prot maximiza-
tion are
PQ  qi + P   C 0 = 0; (4)
PZ  qi  D0 = 0: (5)
We assume the existence of a symmetric Nash equilibrium7 and denote the symmetric Nash
equilibrium output and investment per rm as q^(n) and z^(n) and the total output and investment
as Q^(n) = nq^(n) and Z^(n) = nz^(n). The comparative statics with respect to the number of
rms n show that dq^=dn < 0, dz^=dn < 0, dQ^=dn > 0, and dZ^=dn > 0 are likely to hold in
general.8 In the following, we conrm that they hold for linear and constant elasticity demand
cases.
 Linear demand case
In the linear demand case, we obtain the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage as
q^ =
(a  c)d
^
; z^ =
a  c
^
; (6)
where the determinant ^ = bd(1 + n)   n > 0 by assumption, which imply that bd > 1 and
d^=dn > 0. Then, we have
dq^
dn
=  (a  c)(bd  1)d
^2
< 0;
dz^
dn
=  (a  d)(bd  1)
^2
< 0;
dQ^
dn
=
(a  c)bd2
^2
> 0;
dZ^
dn
=
(a  c)bd
^2
> 0;
which indicates that as the number of rms increases, individual output and investment decrease,
whereas the total output and investments increase. Furthermore, we have
lim
n!1 q^ = limn!1 z^ = 0; limn!1 Q^ =
(a  c)d
bd  1 > 0; limn!1 Z^ =
a  c
bd  1 > 0;
which implies that as the number of rms approaches innity, individual output and investment
converge to zero, while the total output and investment converge to positive and nite values.
7For the existence and uniqueness of a symmetric Nash equilibrium, we must assume (1 + n)PQ +QPQQ < 0
(see Vives 1999) and the Hessian matrix to be negative denite.
8In a symmetric (second-stage) equilibrium, from (4) and (5), we have the following comparative static results:
dQ^
dn
=
1

n
q^(D00   PZZQ^)(C00   PQ) + (PQZQ^+ nPZ)(z^D00  D0)
o
dZ^
dn
=
1

n
q^(PQZQ^+ PZ)(C
00   PQ) +

PQQQ^+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00

(z^D00  D0)
o
;
where the determinant is
 
h
PQQQ^+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
i
(PZZQ^ D00)  (PQZQ^+ nPZ)(PQZQ^+ PZ) > 0:
Furthermore, we nd that dQ^=dn > 0 and dZ^=dn > 0 hold for (a) PQZQ^ + PZ > 0 and (b) the absolute value
of (z^D00  D0) is not signicantly large. The condition (a) holds naturally because it only requires the marginal
prot of production to be the increasing function of z. The condition (b) requires the curvature of the investment
cost function to not be signicantly large or small.
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 Constant elasticity demand case
In the constant elasticity demand case, we obtain the symmetric equilibrium of the second stage
as
q^ =
(a d +  1)
nd 
; z^ =
 1
nd 
; (7)
where
  n  1
c n 
> 0;
and d=dn > 0. We conrm that the determinant ^ is positive because
^ =
c n d2 1 2
1 + a d 1 
> 0:
Then, we have the following comparative statics:
dq^
dn
=  
2 1(n  2) + ad [(n  1)   1] 1 	
n2 d(n  1) < 0;
dz^
dn
=  (n  1)
 1
n2d(n  1) < 0;
dQ^
dn
=
2 1

(2  1) + ad21 
nd(n  1) > 0;
dZ^
dn
=
(  1) 1
nd(n  1) > 0:
As the number of rms increases, individual output and investment decrease, whereas the total
output and investment increase. In addition, we have
lim
n!1 q^ = limn!1 z^ = 0; limn!1 Q^ =
c 2(c+ acd)
d
> 0; lim
n!1 Z^ =
c1 
d
> 0;
which implies that as the number of rms approaches innity, individual output and investment
converge to zero, while the total output and investment converge to positive and nite values.
3.2 Entry decisions and the second best
In the rst stage, rms enter the market until their prots fall to zero. Therefore, the free-entry
number of rms is dened as n^f such that
^ (n^f ) = P

Q^ (n^f ) ; Z^ (n^f )

q^ (n^f )  C (q^ (n^f )) D (z^ (n^f )) K = 0: (8)
We then consider the second-best problem for a social planner who can control the number
of rms entering the market. Let cW (n) denote the total surplus as
cW (n)  Z Q^
0
P (s; Z^)ds  nC(q^)  nD(z^)  nK:
Using (4) and (5), we have
cW 0(n) = P q^ + ndq^
dn

+ PZQ^

z^ + n
dz^
dn

  C   nC 0 dq^
dn
 D   nD0 dz^
dn
 K
= ^   PQQ^ dq^
dn
+ PZQ^

dz^
dn
(n  1) + z^

:
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The social planner chooses the second-best number of rms n = n^sb, which maximizes cW (n),
implying cW 0(n^sb) = 0 if n^sb > 1:
We assume that the second-order condition should be satised, i.e., cW 00(n) < 0. Considering
^(n^f ) = 0, we have cW 0(n^f ) =  PQQ^ dq^
dn| {z }
business stealing
+ PZQ^
dZ^ 1
dn| {z }
common property
; (9)
where Z^ 1  (n  1)z^. Thus, n^f > n^sb holds when (9) is negative; in this case, free entry leads
to excess entry. On the other hand, n^f < n^sb holds when (9) is positive; in this case, free entry
leads to insucient entry.
The rst term on the right-hand side of (9) is the business stealing eect of entry (Mankiw
and Whinston 1986). Firms enter the market without taking into account the negative impact
of their entry on their rival's protability. As shown below, the term is usually negative. The
second term represents the common property eect of entry. Firms do not take into account
the positive impact of their investment (or contribution to common property resources) on their
rival's protability. As shown above (dZ^=dn > 0 holds for both linear and constant elasticity
demand cases), the term is usually positive in this simultaneous co-opetition case. Therefore,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 1
In a simultaneous co-opetition game, free entry results in socially insucient entry whencW 0(n^f ) >
0 and socially excessive entry when cW 0(n^f ) < 0. In particular, insucient entry results hold
when the common property eect dominates the business stealing eect of entry.
In the following, we clearly demonstrate the conditions under which the excess or insucient
entry theorem applies in linear and constant elasticity demand cases.
 Linear demand case
From (6), the free-entry equilibrium number of rms, n^f , satises
^(n^f ) =
(a  c)2(2bd  1)d
2 [bd(1 + n^f )  n^f ]2
 K = 0:
Because ^(n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 ^ =  K, we conrm that
lim
K!0
n^f =1:
Therefore, the number of rms under free entry goes to innity when there are no entry costs.
The socially optimal (second-best) number of rms, n^sb, satises
cW 0(n^sb) = ^(n^sb)  (a  c)2dn^sb
[bd(1 + n^sb)  n^sb]3
 
1  3bd+ b2d2 = 0:
In addition, we have
cW 0(n^sb)K=0 = (a  c)2d[n^sb(3bd  1) + bd(2bd  1)]2 [bd(1 + n^sb)  n^sb]3 > 0;
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which implies that
lim
K!0
n^sb =1:
Therefore, the second-best number of rms goes to innity when there are no entry costs. Then,
we have
cW 0(n^f ) =   (a  c)2dn^f
[bd(1 + n^f )  n^f ]3
 
1  3bd+ b2d2 Q 0 , bd R 3 +p5
2
:
Thus, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Under linear demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic invest-
ment cost, the free-entry equilibrium of the simultaneous co-opetition game yields excessive (in-
sucient) entry for greater (smaller) investment costs and/or steeper (atter) inverse demand.
The greater (smaller) b and/or d, the more likely that free entry results in excess (insucient)
entry. This result is quite intuitive. When b is large (or demand is less elastic), the equilibrium
price signicantly decreases by rm entry, leading to a greater business stealing eect. When d
is large (or investment is more costly), the total investment is less sensitive to rm entry, leading
to a smaller common property eect.
We provide the following numerical examples: in the case of a = 10; b = 1; c = 1; and
K = 2, we nd that n^f  9 < n^sb  12 for d = 2, which corresponds to the insucient entry
theorem. On the other hand, we nd that n^f  6 > n^sb  4 for d = 6, which corresponds to the
excess entry theorem.
 Constant elasticity demand case
From (13), the free-entry equilibrium number of rms, n^f , satises
^(n^f ) =
c2 1
 
1 + 2ad1 

2n^fd(n  1)  K = 0:
Because ^(n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 ^ =  K, we conrm
lim
K!0
n^f =1:
Thus, the free-entry number of rms goes to innity when there are no entry costs, as in the
linear demand case.
The socially optimal number of rms, n^sb, satises
cW 0(n^sb) = ^(n^sb)  cad (n^sb  1) [ (n^sb   1)  1]  cn^sb [ (n^sb + 1)  n^sb] 	(n^sb  1)3dn^sb = 0:
We also nd that
lim
K!0
n^sb =1;
which implies that the second-best number of rms goes to innity as K approaches zero.
Then we have
cW 0(n^f ) =  cad (n^f   1) [ (n^f   1)  1]  cn^f [ (n^f + 1)  n^f ] 	(n^f   1)3dn^f Q 0
, d R c n^f [(n^f + 1)  n^f ] 

a(n^f   1)[(n^f   1)  1]:
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Figure 1: Equilibrium number of rms and the second-best: The case for  = 3 (left) and  = 1:2
(right).
Therefore, the excess (insucient) entry theorem applies for larger (smaller) values of a, d and c.
We cannot analytically derive the impact of  on the sign of cW 0(n^f ), but the numerical examples
demonstrate that the excess entry theorem is more likely to hold for smaller value of , i.e., the
case of less elastic demand.
Corollary 2 Under constant elasticity demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic
investment cost, the free-entry equilibrium of the simultaneous co-opetition game yields excessive
(insucient) entry for larger (smaller) market size, greater (smaller) investment and production
costs, and smaller (greater) price elasticity of demand.
In his simple Cournot model with endogenous entry, Varian (1995) demonstrates that exces-
sive entry results hold for constant elasticity demand cases. Our result extends this by allowing
rms co-opetitive investment and shows that free entry leads to either excessive or insucient
entry depending on the value of price elasticity and investment cost.
We provide the following numerical examples. In the case of a = 2, c = 0:1,  = 2, and
K = 0:1, we nd that n^f  14 and n^sb  19 for d = 1, and n^f  10 and n^sb  8 for d = 8.
Therefore, free entry leads to excess (insucient) entry when d is large (small). In the case
of a = 2, c = 0:1, d = 3, and K = 0:1, we nd that n^f  49 < n^sb  74 for  = 3, and
n^f  5 > n^sb  4 for  = 1:2. Figure 1 depicts these situations. In each panel, prots and
welfare in the second-stage equilibrium are depicted. The left (right) panel depicts the case
in which price elasticity of demand is high (low), and indicates that insucient (excess) entry
occurs.
4 Free entry under sequential co-opetition
In this section, we consider a sequential co-opetition as a three-stage game. In the rst stage,
rms enter the market. In the second stage, they non-cooperatively decide their investment.
Finally, in the third stage, they choose output in a Cournot fashion. In contrast with that in
the simultaneous co-opetition game, investment in this game has a strategic nature in the sense
that each rm chooses its investment taking into account its eect on market competition in the
subsequent stage.
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4.1 Production decisions
The game is solved by backward induction. In the third stage, rms choose their output and
the rst-order conditions are given by (4). Then, a symmetric Nash equilibrium output per rm
is given by ~q(n;Z) with @~q=@n < 0 and @~q=@zi = @~q=@zj > 0, for i 6= j. In addition, the total
output in a symmetric equilibrium is ~Q(n;Z) with @ ~Q=@n > 0 and @ ~Q=@zi = @ ~Q=@zj > 0, for
i 6= j.9
4.2 Investment decisions
In the second stage, each rm chooses the amount of investment by solving the following maxi-
mization problem given other rms' investment Z i 
P
j 6=i zj :
max
zi
i(zi; Z i) = P

~Q; zi + Z i

~q   C(~q) D(zi) K:
Using (4), the rst-order conditions are as follows:10
@i
@zi
=

PQ
@~q
@zi
(n  1) + PZ

~q  D0 = 0: (10)
Comparing (5) and (10) claries the dierence between investment choices in the simultaneous
and sequential co-opetition games. In the latter, rms choose their investment with anticipation
that their investment will make the rival aggressive (increase rival's output), as represented by
the rst term in parentheses in (10). This pre-commitment eect of investment reduces the
incentive to invest. Therefore, ceteris paribus, rms' incentive to invest is lower in the sequential
than in the simultaneous co-opetition game.
Solving (10) for all i = 1;    ; n, we derive the equilibrium investment in a symmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in the second stage as denoted by z(n) and Z(n)  nz. In addition, we
denote the equilibrium output in a symmetric subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the second
stage as q(n)  ~q(n; Z) and Q(n)  ~Q(n; Z).
In general, the eects of entry on q, z, Q, and Z are quite complex. Therefore, in the
following, we provide the comparative static results for linear and constant elasticity demand
cases.
 Linear demand case
Specifying the inverse demand as (2), we obtain the third-stage equilibrium:
~q(n;Z) =
a  c+ Z
b(n+ 1)
; ~Q(n;Z) =
n(a  c+ Z)
b(n+ 1)
:
9We have the comparative static results:
@~q
@n
=   PQQ~q
2 + PQ~q
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
< 0;
@~q
@zi
=
@~q
@zj
=   PZ
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
> 0;
@ ~Q
@n
=
(PQ   C00)~q
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
> 0;
@ ~Q
@zi
=
@ ~Q
@zj
=   nPZ
PQQ ~Q+ (n+ 1)PQ   C00
> 0:
10We assume that the second-order conditions are satised, i.e.,
@2i
@z2i
=

PQ
@~q
@zi
(n  1) + PZ

@~q
@zi
+

PQQ
@ ~Q
@~q
@~q
@zi
(n  1) + PQ @
2~q
@z2i
(n  1) + PZZ

~q  D00 < 0:
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We can easily conrm @~q=@n < 0, @~q=@zi > 0, @ ~Q=@n > 0, and @ ~Q=@zi = @ ~Q=@zj > 0.
Solving the second-stage problem, we have the following reaction function:
zi = Ri(Z i)  2(a  c)(n+ 1)2bd  2 +
2
(n+ 1)2bd  2Z i;
which indicates that the investment choices are strategic complements. This is because one
rm's investment increases total demand (or market size), which increases other rms' marginal
prots of investment.
The second-stage equilibrium is characterized as
q(n) =
(a  c)(n+ 1)d

; z(n) =
2(a  c)

; (11)
where   (n + 1)2bd   2n > 0 from the stability of Nash equilibrium in the second stage.
Therefore, we nd that
dq
dn
=  (a  c)d[(n+ 1)
2bd  2]
2
< 0;
dz
dn
=  4(a  c)[(n+ 1)bd  1]
2
< 0;
d Q
dn
=
(a  c)2d[(n+ 1)2bd  2n2]
2
R 0 , bd R 2n
2
(n+ 1)2
; (12)
d Z
dn
=  2bd(a  c)(n
2   1)
2
< 0:
We should notice that d Z=dn < 0 holds for any n, indicating that an increase in the number
of rms actually decreases total as well as individual investment. However, as (12) indicates,
whether the sign of d Q=dn is positive or negative depends on the value of b, d, and n. When b
and/or d are small, an increase in the number of rms signicantly decreases total investment ( Z)
and thus total demand for the product. As described in Section 5, this property is particularly
important when considering the eect of entry regulation on consumers.
Furthermore, we have
lim
n!1 q = limn!1 z = limn!1
Z = 0; lim
n!1
Q =
a  c
b
> 0;
which indicates that as the number of rms increases, the total output converges to the per-
fect competition outcome without investment activities because the total amount of common
property resources converges to zero. This contrasts with the case of simultaneous co-opetition.
 Constant elasticity demand case
Specifying the inverse demand as (3), we obtain the third-stage equilibrium:
~q(n;Z) =
(a+ Z)
n
; ~Q(n;Z) = (a+ Z);
where   n 1c n  > 0, as in the previous section. In addition, we obtain @~q=@n < 0, @~q=@zi > 0,
@ ~Q=@n > 0, and @ ~Q=@zi = @ ~Q=@zj > 0.
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Solving for the second-stage problem, we have
z =
c
(n  1)nd; q =
a
n
+
c2
(n  1)dn: (13)
The comparative static yields the following:
dq
dn
=  
2 1 f2(n  1)  1g+ adn f(n  1)  1g1 
dn2(n  1) < 0;
dz
dn
=   [(2n  1)  1]
 1
dn2(n  1) < 0;
d Q
dn
=
2 1

adn1    (n  2)c
dn2(n  1) R 0; (14)
d Z
dn
=  (n  1)
 1
dn2(n  1) < 0:
We nd that d Z=dn < 0 also holds under constant elasticity demand, indicating that an increase
in the number of rms decreases total investment. The sign of (14) is ambiguous, but it is more
likely to be negative when  is smaller, c is larger, and/or d is smaller.11
In addition, we have
lim
n!1 q = limn!1 z = limn!1
Z = 0; lim
n!1
Q = ac  > 0;
Therefore, we nd that as the number of rms increases, the total output converges to the
perfect competition outcome without investment activities and the total investment converges
to zero, as in the linear demand case.
4.3 Entry decisions and the second best
In the rst stage, rms enter the market until their prots fall to zero. Therefore, the free entry
number of rms is dened as nf such that
 (nf ) = P
  Q (nf ) ; Z (nf )  q (nf )  C (q (nf )) D (z (nf )) K = 0
We then consider the second-best problem for a social planner who can control the number
of rms entering the market. Let W (n) denote the total surplus as
W (n) 
Z Q
0
P (s; Z)ds  nC(q)  nD(z)  nK:
Then, we have
W
0(n) = P

q + n
dq
dn

+ PZ Q

z + n
dz
dn

  C   nC 0 dq
dn
 D   nD0 dz
dn
 K
=    PQ Q

dq
dn
+
@~q
@z
dz
dn
(n  1)

+ PZ Q

dz
dn
(n  1) + z

:
The social planner chooses n = nsb, which maximizes W (n), implying
W
0(n)jn=nsb = 0 if nsb > 1:
11For example, we have d Q=dn < 0 when  = 1, c = 10, a = 2, d = 4 and n = 12.
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We assume that the second-order condition is satised (W 00 < 0). Thus, we have
W
0(nf ) =  PQ Q
"
dq
dn
+
@ ~Q 1
@z
dz
dn
#
| {z }
business stealing
+ PZ Q
d Z 1
dn| {z }
common property
: (15)
The rst term is the business stealing eect of entry, and its sign is negative. Private rms
consider neither the negative direct impact of their entry on rivals' outputs (represented by
dq=dn < 0) nor the negative indirect impact through the change in rivals' investments (repre-
sented by (d ~Q 1=dz)(dz=dn) < 0). The second term is the common property eect of entry.
Diering from the case of non-commitment investment, the sign of this eect is negative when
d Z=dn < 0 holds in the second stage. Private rms do not take into account the negative impact
of their entry on their rivals' protability through the decrease in total amount of investment.
Then, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2
In a sequential co-opetition game, free entry more likely to result in socially excessive entry and
the depletion of common property resources.
This proposition contrasts with the result of the simultaneous co-opetition case in Proposition
1. In the sequential co-opetition case, each rm chooses its investment with anticipation that
its investment increases not only its own output but also its rivals' output in the subsequent
stage owing to the pre-commitment eect of investment, as shown in (10). Therefore, each
rm's investment is strategically chosen to be smaller than that in the case of simultaneous
co-opetition. In addition, as the number of rms increases, the strategic eect is strengthened.
As a result, the total amount of common property resources becomes a decreasing function of
the number of rms. In general, the total provision of voluntarily provided public goods is an
increasing function of the number of players, while the individual contribution to public goods
is a decreasing function. However, in our case, the total amount of common property resource is
also decreasing function of the number of rms. This is because when n increases, there are two
channels to reduce rms' incentive to invest: (1) rms tend to free ride on others' contributions
and (2) individual outputs become small, thus reducing the marginal prots of investment.
In the following, we conrm the proposition for the linear and constant elasticity demand
cases and obtain a strong result indicating that excess entry results hold for the sequential
co-opetition game even when there are no entry costs.
 Linear demand case
From (11), the free-entry equilibrium number of rms, nf , satises
(nf ) =
(a  c) (nf + 1)2bd  2 d
2
 K = 0:
On the basis of the fact that (n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 =  K, we conrm
lim
K!0
nf =1;
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which indicates that the free-entry number of rms goes to innity when there are no entry costs.
After some tedious manipulation, we nd that the second-best number of rms, nsb, satises
W
0(nsb) = (nsb) 
(a  c)2
h
2bd
 
n3sb + n
2
sb   6nsb   6

+ (nsb + 1)
3 b2d2 + 8
i
nd
3
= 0:
In addition, we have
W
0(n)

K=0
=
(a  c)2d
3
h
b2d2(n+ 1)3   2bd(n4 + 2n3   3n2   3n+ 1)  4n
i
= 0
when
bd =
n3 + n2   4n+ 1 +pn6 + 2n5   7n4   6n3 + 22n2   4n+ 1
(n+ 1)2
; (16)
and W 00(n) < 0. Therefore, we nd that
lim
K!0
nsb = n;
such that n satises the condition of (16). In other words, the second-best number of rms is
positive and nite even when there are no entry costs.
Then, we nd that
W
0(nf ) =  
(a  c)2
h
2bd

n3f + n
2
f   6nf   6

+ (nf + 1)
3 b2d2 + 8
i
nfd
3
< 0;
which indicates that free entry necessarily results in excessive entry.
Corollary 3 Under linear demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic invest-
ment cost, the free-entry equilibrium of the sequential co-opetition game yields excessive entry.
Furthermore, this result holds even when there are no entry costs.
We provide the following numerical examples. In the case of a = 10, b = 1, c = 1, d = 2, and
K = 2, then nf  6 > nsb  2. In the case of a = 10, b = 1, c = 1, d = 8, and K = 0, then
nf =1 > nsb  5, which clearly shows that excess entry property holds even when K = 0.
 Constant elasticity demand case
From (13), the free-entry equilibrium number of rms, nf , satises
(nf ) =
c2 [c(2nf   1) + 2adnf (nf   1) ]
2dn2f (nf   1)2
 K = 0:
On the basis of the fact that (n) is strictly decreasing in n and limn!1 =  K, we conrm
lim
K!0
nf =1;
which indicates that the free-entry number of rms goes to innity when there are no entry costs.
After some tedious manipulation, we nd that the second-best number of rms, nsb, satises
W
0(nsb) = (nsb) 
c2
(n  1)3dn2sb
"
adnsb  (nsb  1) f(nsb   1)  1g
+ cfnsb(n2sb   4) + nsb(nsb  1) + 1 + g
#
= 0:
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Then, we nd that
W
0(nf ) =  
c2
(nf   1)3dn2f
"
adnf  (nf   1) f(nf   1)  1g
+ cfnf (n2f   4) + nf (nf   1) + 1 + g
#
< 0;
which indicates that free entry necessarily results in excessive entry.
Corollary 4 Under constant elasticity demand, constant marginal production cost, and quadratic
investment cost, the free-entry equilibrium of the sequential co-opetition game yields excessive
entry. Furthermore, this result holds even when there are no entry costs.
In this sequential co-opetition game, as Corollaries 3 and 4 indicate, the excess entry theorem
applies even when there are no entry (set-up) costs for entrants. The results reect that as the
number of rms increases, the total amount of socially benecial investment reduces independent
of the existence of xed entry costs.
In the constant elasticity demand case, the second-best number of rms whenK = 0 cannot be
analytically derived; therefore, we provide numerical examples to show that excess entry property
holds even when K = 0. In the case of a = 20, c = 0:1, d = 4, and  = 2, nf  31 > nsb  7
holds for K = 0:1 and nf  1 > nsb  9 holds for K = 0.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss policy implications of our results for entry regulation. Then, we
briey consider a case of investment cooperation wherein rms cooperatively invest in common
property resources to maximize producers' surplus (industry prots) but remain rivals in the
market.
The standard excess-entry theorem presented by Mankiw andWhinston (1986) and Suzumura
and Kiyono (1987) reveals that the entry of new rms into a Cournot oligopoly market reduces
the output of other incumbent rms and yields a socially wasteful duplication of entry (set-up)
costs. In other words, entry regulation may improve social welfare by preventing the duplication
of entry costs, although it reduces consumers' surplus as a result of higher prices. Therefore, the
amount of entry costs is used as a measure of whether entry regulation can improve welfare.12
However, our study presents results dierent from those of previous studies in terms of eects
of entry regulation on social welfare and consumers' surplus. First, our results show that the
magnitude of entry costs may not be a appropriate justication for entry regulations if the
industry shares common property resources that aect market demand. One possibility is that
a free-entry equilibrium leads to socially insucient entry even when rms when rms incur
large entry costs. Our Proposition 1 and Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that free-entry equilibrium
may yield socially insucient entry under a simultaneous co-opetition game even when the entry
cost is large. This situation occurs because entry may improve (increases) the quality of (the
investment for) common property resources. In this case, the government can improve welfare
as well as consumers' surplus by encouraging market entry, e.g., by subsidizing entry. Another
12For welfare evaluation of entry regulation, Kim (1997) considers the strategic behavior of rms and the
government and shows that entry regulation to prevent excess entry induces the incumbent to behave strategically
against the government. As a result, the nal outcome is socially suboptimal compared with that in the case
without government intervention.
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possibility is that a free-entry equilibrium leads to socially excessive entry even when there are
no entry costs. Our Proposition 2 and Corollaries 3 and 4 imply that excess-entry results hold
under a sequential co-opetition game even when there are no entry costs. The total amount of
common property resources decreases by entry into the industry because the entry signicantly
reduces each rm's incentives to invest as a result of the pre-commitment eect. In this case,
the government should regulate entry into the industry to prevent the depletion of the common
property resources.
Second, our results imply that the eect of entry regulation on consumers' surplus depends
on the types of investment for common property resources. When the excess entry result holds
in a free-entry equilibrium of the simultaneous co-opetition game, entry regulation improves
social welfare but reduces consumers' surplus because it reduces total consumption by shrinking
the consumers' willingness to pay for the product (it shifts the demand inward). On the other
hand, in a free-entry equilibrium of the sequential co-opetition game, the equilibrium necessarily
leads to excess entry and entry regulation improves social welfare. In addition, the regulation
may also improve consumers' surplus because it increases both the total amount of common
property resources (d Z=dn < 0) and total consumption (see (12) and (14)). In this case, the
entry regulation alleviates the tragedy-of-the-commons problem and benets both producers
and consumers.
Finally, we briey mention an extension of our model: cooperation in investment for com-
mon property resources. In some industries, rms cooperatively decide their investment (or
minimum eort) for common property resources. One concrete example is the voluntary cre-
ation of safety standards in Japanese long-route bus companies. By cooperatively establishing
stricter safety standard in bus services (e.g., reducing work hours for bus driver and installing
safety systems such as collision mitigation brake systems, pre-crash safety systems, and event
data recorders), the bus industry can improve consumers' safety concerns for long-route bus
services, thereby increasing consumers' willingness to pay for the services. We can examine
the situation by extending our sequential co-opetition game. Consider that rms cooperatively
choose their investment to maximize the industry prots in the second stage. Then, as shown
in the Appendix, an additional entry into the industry (an increase in the number of rms)
necessarily increases the total investment; as a result, the quality of common property resources
from such investment cooperation solves the free-rider problem of investment. Therefore, under
certain conditions, free-entry equilibrium in the sequential co-opetition game with investment
cooperation leads to insucient entry. This implies that even if there are some entry costs
and investment has commitment value, encouraging entry into the industry may improve social
welfare when the industry can cooperatively manage its commonly shared resources.
6 Concluding Remarks
In many industries, rms share common property resources that aect the consumers' willingness
to pay for products. This study investigates whether free entry leads to socially excessive or
insucient entry in a co-opetitive model in which rms simultaneously compete and cooperate.
We explore two approaches to modeling rms' co-opetitive behavior: simultaneous and sequential
co-opetition. We nd that in the former, in which rms simultaneously decide their investments
and output, free entry leads to insucient or excessive entry depending on the relative magnitude
17
of the business stealing and common property eects of entry. In particular, free entry is more
likely to result in socially insucient entry when production and investment costs are smaller
and/or price elasticity is greater. On the other hand, in the latter, in which rms can use
investment as a commitment, free entry leads to excess entry owing to the negative common
property eect. Interestingly, this excessive entry result holds even when there are no entry
(set-up) costs. These ndings contribute to the literature on excess entry property in oligopoly
markets.
Appendix
In this Appendix, we consider a case of investment cooperation in which rms invest coopera-
tively in common property resources to maximize industry prots but remain rivals in Cournot
competition. In particular, we examine the social desirability of free entry in an extended se-
quential co-opetition game in which rms make entry decisions in the rst stage, determine the
level of investment required from all rms in the second stage, and compete in a Cournot fashion
in the third stage.
The third stage equilibrium is the same as that derived in Section 4.1, so the Nash equilibrium
output per rm is ~q(n;Z) and total output ~Q(n;Z). In the second stage, the level of investment
(z = Z=n) is determined to maximize the joint prots:
max
z
nX
i=1
i = P ( ~Q;Z) ~Q  nC(~q)  nD (z)  nK:
Arranging the rst-order condition by using (4), we have
PQ
@~q
@z
(n  1) + nPZ

~q  D0 = 0; (17)
which implies that rms can internalize positive external eects of investment for market expan-
sion (i.e., nPZ in the rst bracket). As a result, the level of cooperative investment is greater
than that of non-cooperative investment.
In what follows, we solve a model for a linear demand case and show that free entry may
lead to socially excessive or insucient entry. Using (17), we characterize the second-stage
equilibrium as
q(n) =
(a  c)(n+ 1)d
	
; z(n) =
2n(a  c)
	
;
where 	  (n+1)2bd 2n2 > 0 (the inequality follows from the second-order condition). Because
	 < , from (11), we have q(n) > q(n) and z(n) > z(n): given that the number of rms is
xed, the individual output and investment under the cooperative investment case is greater
than that under the non-cooperative investment case. Then, we have the following comparative
statics:
d Q
dn
=
(a  c)d (n+ 1)2bd+ 2n2
	2
> 0;
d Z
dn
=
(a  c)(n+ 1)bdn
	2
> 0:
In contrast to the non-cooperative investment case analyzed in Section 4, an additional entry
in this case increases the total investment and total output because entry does not increase the
incentive to free ride on investments in common property resources. In addition, we have
lim
n!1 q = limn!1 z = 0; limn!1
Q =
(a  c)d
bd  2 > 0; limn!1
Z =
a  c
bd  2 > 0:
18
Note that these limiting values are similar to those in the case of the simultaneous co-opetition.
The total investment converges to positive and nite values as the number of rms approaches
innity.
In the rst stage, rms enter the market until their prots fall to zero. The free-entry number
of rms is dened as nf such that (nf ) = 0. The associated level of welfare is dened by W (nf ).
Then, we have
W 0(nf ) =  
nf (a  c)2d
h
b2d2 (nf + 1)
3   2bd (nf + 1) (5nf + 2) nf + 8n3f
i
h
bd(nf + 1)2   2n2f
i3 ;
where
W 0(nf ) Q if bd R
nf
q
17n2f + 12nf + 4 + 5n
2
f + 2nf
(nf + 1)
2 :
This indicates that the greater (smaller) the value of b and/or d, the more likely free entry would
be to lead to excess (insucient) entry. In other words, even when investment has commitment
value, investment cooperation may lead to insucient entry.
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